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FINDING THE CORRECT LANGUAGE:  
DEFINING FRAGMENTED ETHNIC IDENTITY IN THE SECOND 
GENERATION IRANIAN AMERICANS
 By Sahar Hashemian
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Introduction
“Imagine learning how to ride a bike, but being given a scooter. That’s how it feels sometimes. Be Iranian, but in 
America. Like okay, I’ll try.” Sara’s frustration of what it’s like to grow up as an immigrant child in America stuck 
with me. She struggled to understand the foreign homeland where her parents grew up; Instead she was left to 
fully grasp the trauma they endured, having left during the turmoil of the Iranian Revolution. Second generation 
immigrants in America are a sizeable group of American society, but not much research has been conducted 
about Iranian Americans, a highly assimilated immigrant group. As a result of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
the immigrants did not see their arrival as a permanent stay but rather as a temporary state of asylum. The two 
phases of Iranian immigration into America functions as a form of separation between those who came before the 
Revolution in 1978 (usually for educational purposes), and those who came after, consisting of mostly political 
refugees and religious groups fleeing from persecution, exiles. The next generation battles understanding their 
ethnic identity through two separate worlds, while subconsciously inheriting the political ideologies and class 
consciousness their parents.
 Moreover, a lack of scholarly literature relating to Iran, and Iranian Americans, leaves questions 
unanswered and gaps open. Its history is inevitably hidden from those in the diaspora as a result of the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 caused from Western Imperialism. As a majority of this generation undergoes socialization in 
a post 9/11 world, their ethnic identities remain racialized and separated through gender divisions and authority 
figures. Thus, the research question I pose is: how do class and gender shape how second generation Iranian 
Americans living in California maintain and understand their ethnic identity? How is this mediated through 
heritage language maintenance?  With such data, we can better further our knowledge of Iranian Americans and 
their positionality between other immigrant groups, since California is home to the largest number of Iranian 
immigrants. Understanding these factors unveils the underlying implications of speaking a heritage language in 
the United States. Speakers are embarrassed and continue having difficulty understanding their ethnic identity 
because of their fragmented language skills. 
Understanding ethnic identity maintenance is complex. I conducted 16 interviews with second generation 
Iranian Americans living in different parts of California and found that socioeconomic status is a significant 
determinant in self-identified ethnic identity: People from the upper class have more opportunities, such as 
greater resources to visit their homeland and engage with others within the diaspora, as well as maintain artifacts 
through connections of the homeland. Symbolic ethnicity is defined through the cultural capital of speaking Farsi 
within the Iranian American community. It is passed down generationally through status markers of English/
Farsi fluency, and education of both parents and engagement with social groups, which lead to social divisions 
between those who grew up in politically charged households and those who did not. Predicating on the idea 
that Farsi is a language to be commodified, those from politically charged households see more capitalistic and 
further advancement for the future of the Persian language compared to their counterparts. This is because of the 
oppression of the media from not only the US government, but from the producers of Iranian TV. Throughout 
the events of 9/11 and onwards, men are more self-consciously aware of displaying their ethnic identity in public 
and create new boundaries for it.  Men, more often, did not speak the language during high school because of the 
negative connotations of being called ‘terrorists’ in middle school and interventions with teachers and at airports. 
The difference between a choice and a pressure is that middle/upper class Iranian Americans feel that it is both, 
but mostly a choice, for those who are politically self-aware. Lower/middle class Iranian Americans maintain 
their ethnic identity through music. Second generation Iranian Americans will be compared through the lens of 
other immigrant groups, demonstrating the similarity of acculturation patterns within the hyphenated American 
identity. I draw in additional primary and secondary literature to back up my arguments. This research will add 
depth to current scholarship on second generation immigrant integration within American context and how 
children of immigrants continue to be ostracized through intergroup and outer group relations. Additionally, this 
paper brings another immigrant group into the conversation by incorporating concepts and methodologies from 
the social sciences (psychology, sociology, ethnic studies, and linguistic anthropology), serving as a reminder that 
language loss is prominent within all immigrant groups. 
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Defining class in the Iranian American community
Class status within the Iranian American community is understood through the lens of ‘whiteness.’ Mostofi 1 
insists that Iranian Americans adhere to American civic nationalism and embrace neoliberalism in their everyday 
lives, contributing to them ‘acting white.’ In Mostofi’s view, Iranian Americans demonstrate different ways of 
‘acting white’ in bleached hair, fake contact lenses, plastic surgery, and removal of body hair in recreation of a 
new public image for group members. Through obeying to such capitalistic changes of commodifying the body, 
Iranian Americans also separate themselves from imposed terrorist labels. The Iranian American body is used 
as a commodity to blend in with the dominant society, since those who can afford to commodify their bodies, 
both economically and psychologically, do so. Iranian Americans in Southern California are often blamed for the 
Iranian Revolution because their ability to actively engage with US free markets and embrace neoliberal ideology 
enthusiastically brings them into invisibility, but does not necessarily lead to a creation of a community. While 
I agree with Mostofi, she overlooks important factors related to the intersection of language, class, and ethnic 
identity within Iranian Americans compared to other immigrant communities. I add to the argument that Iranian 
Americans are whitening through assimilation by not speaking the language in public as a result of interventions 
with authority figures. As a result, Farsi is not commodified the same in public versus the private sphere. Women 
are more likely to ‘whiten’ their bodies, but remove the mask of whiteness in the space of the home. For second 
generation Iranian Americans who keep liminal to the homeland, the ability to keep the language maintained 
means speaking comfortably in their new and permanent homeland, the dominant society in the eyes of other 
Americans. Iranians in Southern California are products of the Pahlavi era, belonging to the secular middle 
class in Iran and are more inclined to Western influence. My study is important because it explains how second 
generation of Iranian Americans view their class status to their ethnic identity.  
In her recent work, Maghbouleh2  asserts that Iranians occupy a conflicting space between white and non-
white. While they are deemed white under the Census Bureau and legal proceedings, their racialized encounters 
at the airport and at school disable them from having complete ‘white privilege.’ Many are able to secure a job 
in the middle class through hard work ethic. Maghbouleh’s work encompasses many different aspects of Iranian 
American identity, but does not differentiate how social class from the parents affects how the second generation 
view maintaining their ethnic identity through language. Naficy3 gives note of the hegemonic processes that exist 
within Iranian American media, especially through the making of television productions and circulated periodicals. 
Class status is present in the making of television production. Royalist television serves as the dominant discourse 
of Iranian television at its start. However, class status has allowed Iranian Americans to be one of the leading 
ethnic groups producing exilic media, allowing the relationship between homeland and diaspora to be strengthened 
through its production and consumption. His book is a bit outdated, as some programs are not currently running 
and have been replaced by new ones. Nonetheless, it highlights the importance of diasporic cultural mediums and 
how these exilic television programs have helped maintain the Persian language in California. I ask critically who 
the consumers of these programs are. 
 Hoffman4 provides the claim that social status and prestige within the Iranian community has changed; it 
is not about being associated with American culture but with “remaining true to one’s own culture and heritage.” 
High social status in Iran correlates to education abroad. French and English are viewed as prestigious languages 
and the Persian language adopts a few words from these languages as well. Although Hoffman states there are 
‘possible signs’ for an emerging community in Los Angeles, she offers no explanation for this. Iranians, unlike 
other immigrant groups, lack an ‘ethnic enclave’ and live in prosperous neighborhoods. With my research, I will 
determine if her claim is justifiable.
Symbolic Ethnic Identity in Language
 1    Mostofi, “Who We Are: The Perplexity of Iranian-American Identity.”
 2    Maghbouleh, “The Limits of Whiteness: Iranian Americans and the Everyday Politics of Race.”
 3    Naficy, “The Making of Exile Culture: Iranian Television in Los Angeles.”
 4    Hoffman, “Language and Culture Acquisition among Iranians in the United States,” 123.
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The leading scholar in sociolinguistics and language and ethnicity, Joshua Fishman5, argues that maintaining 
language is a practice of group membership and group loyalty. It is ambiguous whether social status has the 
ability to either maintain the language or cause language shift. While some contest that class status helps maintain 
the language, others argue that it is a confounding variable which leads to a faster shift to English. However, no 
model theory has been made to predict factors of language maintenance and shift across ethnic groups. These 
are determined through various language orientations: language as a right, language as a resource, and language 
as a problem. Ruiz’s6 defines language as a resource as a way to conserve and manage language, language-as-a-
problem as a way to overcome economic and political disadvantages in order to integrate, and language as a right 
as a way to not discriminate against language use that links itself to culture. I argue the ways these concepts can 
be applied as a separate ‘values system’ for public and private symbolic identity, and through which outlets the 
second generation adopt specific ideologies. Herbert Gans7, a leading scholar in ethnic identity, defines symbolic 
ethnicity as “a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love 
for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior.” Common 
sense ideology would be quick to assume that because the largest diaspora of Iranians living outside of Iran 
are in California, language loss does not seem to be a problem. I examine this phenomenon through the lens of 
ethnolinguistic vitality theory, which looks at how an ethnolinguistic group behaves “as a distinctive and active 
collective entity in intergroup situations”8 such variables include group status, demography, and institutional 
support. My research applies all three of these aspects in order to determine how the language promotes a positive 
ethno-linguistic consciousness or negative ethno-linguistic consciousness for ethnic identity and if it is viewed as 
a commodified asset in certain situations, while selectively privatized in others through different periods of life.
Second Generation Iranian Americans + Other Immigrant groups
Due to a lack of scholarly literature available about Iranian Americans, and even less on second generation Iranian 
Americans, I compare Cuban Americans and Asian Americans, the two other immigrant communities who follow 
similar ‘model minority’ trajectories. Because of Iranian Americans deemed whiteness, their experience is similar 
to Asian Americans. From a young age, Iranian Americans believe that there is an innate difference between 
themselves and other immigrant communities; However, they are not as unique as they think. This difference 
binds itself into similarity with other immigrant groups; in so forth English is the common language, the most 
important means of ‘acting white.’ One common misconception is that members from a ‘model minority’ group 
face no ‘real’ problems. Sociologists such as Mia Tuan’s9 study of third, fourth, and fifth generation Chinese and 
Japanese Americans helps broaden our understanding of how the ‘model minority myth’ within Asian ethnic 
groups shape their sense of belonging and bicultural behaviors. For example, survivors of the Japanese internment 
camps raised their kids without Japanese culture in efforts to Americanize them, believing that doing so would 
help them economically. Through giving their children “more Anglicized names”10 would result blending in with 
dominant society – Japanese and Chinese Americans appear as more American during class time, role call, and 
grammar school. Cultural trauma for Asian Americans is still salient, which is similar to Iranian Americans. Both 
groups identify as American through key phrases and concepts of ‘American-ness,’ and domains of life where 
language is maintained. While Tuan’s book is informative, her analysis lacks a comprehensive look at how class 
relations separate the ways ethnic identity is contested in the public and private spheres – and a more in depth 
analysis of how gender plays a role into that, which will be discussed more in my analysis portion of this research. 
Only two studies have been conducted that examines the ethnic identity construction of second generation Iranian 
Americans. Mahdi’s11 study, conducted in 1998, is outdated and shows the need for future research. He does 
not account for the various socio-political forces that have ultimately shaped how second generation Iranian 
 5    Fishman
 6    Ruiz, “Orientations in Language Planning.”
 7    Gans, “Symbolic Ethnicity,” 9
 8    Giles et. al,“Towards a Theory of Language in Ethnic Group Relations,” 308.
 9    Tuan, “Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites? The Asian Ethnic Experience Today.”
 10    Tuan.
 11    Mahdi, “Ethnic Identity Among Second Generation Iranian Americans in the United States.”
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Americans group consciousness is through internal and external ethnic power relations. In his survey results, 
which consisted of a biased sample of immigrants who were active in Iranian organizations, he found there to be 
a positive correlation between the negative stereotypes from the Iranian Hostage Crisis and a privatized Iranian 
American identity, indicating that many did not want to learn the language or improve on their minimal skills. 
My study is important because it focuses on the socialization time period after 9/11, another important socio-
political event that subconsciously shapes how the second generation maintains their ethnic identity and offers 
a more detailed account of the fluidity of Iranian American identity through language. He states that the second 
generation’s desire to maintain their identity predicates on an “Americanized” understanding of it, which is shown 
in the indifference of improving their language skills. In his study of 401 survey participants, 53.6% love to know 
Persian well while 44.5% have no interest to learn or improve. This is also because many members of the second 
generation cannot read or read Farsi, so my research will show the different ways it is maintained.
There is sparse research on second generation Iranian Americans and their ethnic identity as well as 
Persian language maintenance in the United States. My study also targets a few individuals who are not actively 
involved in Iranian community organizations as a way to diversify the sample. Mehdi Bozorgmehr12, a leading 
scholar in studying the Iranian American community, conducted a study in 2010 involving how second generation 
Iranian Americans define success in comparison to other second generation immigrant children in America. 
He uses quantitative data for his research from Immigration and Naturalization Services and Department of 
Homeland Security, as well as American Community Survey data from 2005-2007 to determine if they follow this 
‘segmented assimilation’ trajectory, which looks specifically at factors of education, language, and occupational 
status. He found minimal differences for gender in regards to educational and occupational success of the second 
generation. Following as a mirror to my study, he only uses quantitative data, while using qualitative interviews 
can offer a more holistic perspective on how much of a role class and gender affect maintaining ethnic identity 
through language. He also leaves room at the end of his research for more research to be conducted, especially 
in regards to comparing Iranian Americans to other immigrant groups. This is what my research will be doing.
One of the studies guiding this paper was Ramezanzadeh’s13 work, where she looked at socio-psychological, 
socio-institutional, and socio-political forces that play a role into heritage language loss of second generation 
Iranian Americans in New York and New Jersey. She argues that Farsi is a language that has been “othered” 
by society and heritage language loss is strongest within the Iranian community than other immigrant groups. 
This is due to how Iran is seen as an “Axis of Evil” deemed by the US, how Iranians are grouped in as terrorists 
after the 9/11 attacks, and media representations of Islam and the Middle East that have contributed into situated 
Iranian American identity in different spheres: she terms this “contemporary orientalism.” Using an interpretative/
qualitative methodology, she concludes that second generation Iranian American college students are not strong 
enough to combat the forces against them in order to maintain their heritage language. At the end of her research, 
she leaves room for future research to be conducted in California, where a larger Iranian population exists. There 
are some gaps in her work, as she does not analyze factors of social class within the Iranian community plays 
a role into their acculturation process and ethnic identity development in the presence of a larger community – 
where media production is present. My work is a continuation of hers. What I am also arguing is the universal 
phenomenon that is occurring within all immigrant groups at almost precisely the same rate, making Iranian 
American immigrant children no less different than their counterparts. 
Methods
Participants were recruited through snowball sampling and purposive sampling. The researcher acknowledges 
possible bias that can result in this research method; However, this methodology was chosen because Iranian 
Americans do not trust researchers14 and gaining access to study the Iranian community is difficult15 (Higgins 
2004; Mostofi 2003). I conducted sixteen interviews: nine women and seven men. Participants ranged from ages 
 12    Bozorgmehr, “Success(ion): Second Generation Iranian-Americans.”
 13    Ramezanzadeh, “Unveiling the Veiled and Veiling the Unveiled: Revealing the Underlying Linguistic Ideologies and 
their Impact on Persian Language Loss and Maintenance among Second-Generation Iranian-American College Students.”
 14    Mostofi, “Who We Are: The Perplexity of the Iranian American Identity.”
 15    Higgins, “Interviewing Iranian Immigrant Parents and Adolescents.”
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18-36. Two participants were recruited through Persian language classes at UC Berkeley, four were recruited 
through various Iranian Student Cultural Organizations from different college campuses (UC Berkeley, Cal Poly 
San Luis Obispo, San Francisco State, UC Irvine), two are friends, one family member, and the remaining were 
referred through interviewees. While a survey response might have gained more participants, semi-structured 
in depth interviews were chosen, allowing for more personal experiences to emerge. Interviews ranged from 
35 minutes to 2.5 hours. Eight follow up interviews were conducted with select participants in order to gain a 
better understanding of how their parent’s immigration history/class status affects their positionality within the 
community, and against Iran. [See Appendix for challenges faced recruiting participants and a further breakdown of 
the characteristics of participants]. Class is defined through educational level of the parents and level of fluency of 
English from the parents, as well as from self-identification of participants and from a demographics questionnaire 
sent out. “Middle class” was how Iranian Americans mostly identified themselves, either in categories of “lower-
middle” or “middle-upper.” The questionnaire consisted of participant’s educational level, education levels of 
mother and father, personal income, income of the family, and fluency of English. I recruited participants who 
weren’t only from the middle/upper class and was able to yield an even number from those who were from the 
lower/middle class and middle/upper class: 8 from each. 
 Different ages were also chosen to understand how political climates affect ethnic identity maintenance 
for those in the diaspora in relation to their language practices: a pre/post 9/11 socialization environment in 
elementary, middle, and high school. Additionally, sampling criteria included: being born in America or arriving 
before age 7, at least 18 years of age, having varying levels of Farsi proficiency, and have at least one parent 
belonging to the ‘secular’ Muslim group. Participant’s parents either came to America for education or for 
political/religious reasons, falling under the category of ‘exile.’ I focus on the Muslim Iranian community because 
according to sociologist and leading scholar in conducting research on the Iranian American community, Mehdi 
Bozorgmehr16 implies that they are the “least ethnic” religious group within the Iranian community, excluding 
Jewish, Armenian, and Baha’I. They are the “least ethnic” because of their desire to create distance between 
themselves and the Islamic Republic. While other religious groups are able to maintain ethnicity through actively 
keeping networks because of persecution and suppression in the home country, the question for how well the 
secular Muslim community maintains ethnicity through language remains. Due to time constraints, I was unable 
to conduct interviews with the parents of select interviewees. In lieu of this, follow up interviews with select 
participants were conducted in order to gauge a more in depth understanding of the cultural traumas endured 
by their parents when migrating here and how that has ultimately affected maintaining their ethnic identity and 
speaking the language.
 Questions were derived from Tuan: Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites? The Asian Ethnic Experience 
Today17 and from Ramezanzadeh’s dissertation, as well as some original questions from the researcher. When 
conducting this research, it is important to acknowledge my own insider status as a researcher that could result 
in bias. However, it is my role as an insider that has allowed me to gain access in studying this community. 
Participants feel more comfortable sharing intimate stories and experiences with me.  All names have been 
changed for confidentiality.
Role of Class
While I originally hypothesized that social status would not play a critical role in how Iranian Americans understand 
and maintain their ethnic identity, class relations and status markers reproduce themselves in the host country. 
Status plays a role in how they view themselves as members of the ‘imagined community.’ The home country 
ideals and characterization carry over, creating the same unequal practices that shape how the second generation 
understands their bicultural orientations. For second generation Iranian Americans, their dual identities in relation 
to their transnationality and language practices reflect the conscious desire to separate themselves from their 
transnational past, especially for the lower/middle class Iranian Americans. The upper/middle class all share in 
common their mother obtaining at least a high school diploma and stricter language planning policies in their 
 16    Bozorgmehr, “Iranian Ethnicity: Iranians in Los Angeles.” 
 17    Tuan.
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households, while lower/middle class Iranian Americans all had mothers that only obtained a high school diploma 
and viewed practicing the language as a problem more so than their counterparts. 
 Upper/middle class Iranian Americans that I interviewed were more likely to maintain their ethnic identity 
through community organizations. Those who are children of political refugees, also categorized as ‘exiles,’ are 
more likely to attend these events than those whose parents came here for educational purposes. This is because 
‘exiles’ cling on to the notion of the homeland more so than other diasporic typologies - and have different 
resources to maintain and recreate their ethnic identity. Children of political refugees attract more inter-ethnic 
friends. All their parents are from Tehran, which relates to how they consume Iranian identity and maintain it 
through redefining and creating their transnational past. For example, I found that members of this group used 
technology as a means to maintain their ethnic identity, particularly Instagram came up as a recurring theme 
amongst the upper/middle class. The materialistic understanding of what it means to be Iranian for the privileged 
class creates a divide in the community of symbolic ethnicity and a different sense of cultural nostalgia. 
Those who had the means to obtain an education in America fantasize about both the pre-Islamic past and lavish 
lifestyle of America, such as describing being Iranian American as ‘houses filled with decor and vases.’ Material 
items were factors that determined ‘being American enough’, such as the clothes you wear and engaging in 
American capitalistic and/or neo-colonial holidays (such as celebrating Christmas and/or Thanksgiving). Their 
social circles and groups were made up of more Iranian friends and defined more as a factor of symbolic ethnicity 
for those who were from the middle/upper class. While all participants did note being American, those who come 
from upper/middle class have a different understanding of what it means to be Iranian American than lower/
middle class. Upper/middle class base Americanism through its foreign policies, through interventions with Iran, 
and in a clearer opposition of America and celebrating cultural holidays. They also noted their positionality as a 
‘model minority immigrant group’ and problematize it.
 When asked, ‘what support would help you in maintaining the language?’ a common theme that middle/
upper class Iranian Americans shared was the need for a more cohesive community, rather than lower/middle 
class Iranian Americans. They were well aware of how their class status affected their ability to interact with the 
community and find resources to maintain their ethnic identity, but still faced the problem of the language being 
lost. Andre, a member of this group whose mother came here for political reasons, is an active board member of an 
Iranian club on his college campus. He shared that “creating more unity within the Iranian community is important, 
fostering less competition will ensure that the language can be passed down to the next generation, because at this 
point, I see it as dying out. It’s a concern I feel everyone has.” Yet, not everyone does have this concern. Through 
an institutional perspective of Persian language maintenance and language loss in California, Naficy himself writes 
that the Iranian radio adoption of ‘“Penglish,” a mixture of Persian and English, will bring “interethnic pluralism 
and multiculturalism” within the Iranian American community.18 However, shortly after the creation of an outlet 
for exilic media in 1991, talk shows air programs three days in Persian and two days in English. The linguistic 
transformation demonstrates the rapid acculturation of Iranians in America and desire to separate themselves 
from the Islamic Republic – while viewership is dictated by the first generation, the second generation keeps 
liminal ties through exposure from their parents.  This is one of the only mediums of circulation for the Persian 
language within the United States. It is apparent then that the second generation Iranian Americans who hear this 
become aware that speaking in English more is acceptable from their Iranian and American counterparts, leading 
to assimilation through language and adoption of ‘language-as-a-problem’ subconscious ideology because of how 
it is ostracised from dominant society and even within the Iranian community. Naficy argues that the creation of 
exilic media in Los Angeles fetishizes the ‘motherland’ for Iranians in exile, which links strong nationalistic and 
racially prejudiced discourse together.19 Political groups such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran, also 
known as Mojahedin, use such Royalist television as a discourse of power to discredit their opponents both within 
–their opponent is both the Islamic Republic and the United States, however, they use different tactics of what 
they show on television in order to achieve this. The body of an exile not the same ‘old’ but transformed into a 
new physicality and reconstruction. This relates to ethnic identity contestations of the second generation, because 
the ways in which gender plays a role in where/who Iranian Americans contest their identities in public/private. 
 18    Naficy, 43.
 19    Naficy.
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The language is commodified through different circumstances. Rhonda, a daughter of two political refugees in 
Iran and a member of the middle-upper class, now actively attends socio-cultural events in America as one of the 
only outlets, besides the maintenance of exilic television, to maintain her ethnic identity. Her father was one of the 
main activists involved in the political group National Council of Resistance, which attempted to overthrow the 
Islamic Republic. She tells me that her parents would go back to Iran, if given the chance of the regime change. 
This is because the creation of such networks historically were based through status structures: political exiles in 
the 1980s funded the periodicals.20 As community organizations are her only way to maintain her ethnic identity, 
besides exilic television, common sense would assume that attachment to group membership is present. However, 
she remarks that “In the community, there’s this toxic environment, of when you speak Farsi to them [others in 
the community from opposing class views], they might talk back to you in a condescending tone. Or just make 
comments, sarcastic comments like ‘oh, look at her, she knows Farsi too.’” Although this doesn’t stop Rhonda 
from speaking the language in general, it stops her from speaking the language in front of other Iranians and 
limits its use to private spaces with her parents and other family members. Rhonda’s point is that social divisions 
within the Iranian community in the United States as a result of class capital carried from Iran disengages her 
interest in speaking the language. This also has historical meaning behind it. The US governments marking the 
National Council of Resistance as a “terrorist group” and banning its television programming makes Rhonda 
more aware of which parts of her ethnic identity to display. Speaking of such political events openly is considered 
‘taboo,’ Rhonda points out. With newer Iranian migrants, “They tend to be a lot more sarcastic and insulting than 
other people. “I usually don’t speak Farsi to them. Based on what I observe of them, I assess the situation and 
I choose whether or not to speak Farsi, or to be a different type of Iranian.” And it is here that Rhonda exhibits 
signs of viewing speaking Farsi under the ‘language-as-a-problem’ ideology and chooses to not display her ethnic 
identity in public. The “different type of Iranian” is based on materialism, superficiality, and higher status, and 
even though she is a member of this group, she makes a distinction between herself and others. Patricia, who is 
also a daughter of political refugees, expresses the discomfort when she says “I feel odd only speaking in Farsi 
constantly.” When I asked her why, she referred to speaking English as being cooler because of growing up in 
America. She also uses code-switching often: “Sometimes I sub the word in English, but I’ll just say the whole 
sentence in Farsi and just use the few words in English. It’s just easier in English.” It’s easier to speak English, 
not only for the convenience of it being one of her primary languages, but in order to avoid getting stopped and 
looked out for speaking the language. 
 Middle/lower class Iranian Americans, meaning those whose mothers only obtained a high school diploma 
and have limited Farsi fluency, maintain their ethnic identity and language maintenance practices through fewer 
interactions with the Iranian American community. A common theme was that they maintain Iranian ethnic identity 
through music consumption. This group also has more paranoia against the Islamic Republic. They associate 
Iran with a state of ‘terrorism’ as a threat to their identity – as a threat of ethnic identity development through 
language. The Islamic Republic’s’ oppression of such artifacts calls for motivation of these second generation 
Iranian Americans to maintain it through these outlets. They maintain the language through classroom settings 
and have limited Farsi capabilities and criteria to speak the language is through ‘creating fluid and function 
sentences’ or through ‘talking about anything going on in our lives, rather than just small talk.’ Their parents are 
not from Tehran, where upper/middle class gatherings most often took place. Sara, who falls under this category, 
remarks how “being in a room with so many Iranians is tiring.” The ‘superficiality’ and ‘materialism’ that defines 
the hyphenated Iranian American symbolic ethnicity does not suit the lower/middle class into conforming within 
it. She is excluded from the Iranian social circles that transcend social status on the basis of educational outcomes 
and language fluency. Instead, she finds a recreation of symbolic ethnicity in forming her own social circles with 
those who aren’t Iranian American.
 A common theme that has come up in my interviews was the lack of support from the community to 
encourage the use of spoken Farsi.. Sam, who is from the lower/middle class, goes into detail about her own 
experience within the Iranian American community: “They can be kind of judgey, I know that’s myself, but I 
don’t want them to make fun of me. Or to think that I’m not speaking correctly. I don’t speak at a Persian event. 
Less judgement would be good. More support from the community as a whole because I’m not the only person 
 20    Naficy.
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who is…who speaks this way. I don’t want them to make fun of me. Or to think that I’m not speaking correctly. 
It’s happened to me a few times and it’s just too much, so that’s why I stopped speaking it.” The support from the 
community and support from elders is helpful. Sam expands on this by saying “So if older people just encouraged 
us to speak more Farsi instead of laughing at us when we didn’t speak it right, it would make an impact.” She 
notes this as also a factor that have led to less chances for her to practice the language actively. “It’s so bad that 
sometimes I won’t hang out with my dad unless I know my sister will be there. Because my dad doesn’t understand 
my Farsi, he doesn’t understand the way I speak. I want it to be better, but I don’t know, I don’t really do anything 
special to make it better, I try talking more but even then it’s so limited. It’s just not one of those languages where 
you think ‘oh I’m going to learn this.’” Her mother’s switch to English and lower educational opportunities that 
play a part in her social class demonstrates how well she can maintain it today. Less opportunities afforded to 
speak it. By not speaking their heritage language, second generation Iranian Americans diminishment of their 
cultural ties are also at stake. 
 While negative stereotypes of Iran affect all in the diaspora, the lower/middle class related it more to how 
often they speak the language today and how often interactions with the community emerge. May, who is also 
from the lower/middle class, remarks limited practical usage of the language: “If anything, you can just put it on 
your resume.” Denoting the status of the language to being inferior to other languages that are more universal 
in America, where speakers aren’t necessarily associated with the nation-state of “terrorism.” Linguist Thomas 
Ricento’s expansion of Ruiz’s ideology of language-as-a-resource discusses how the status of Farsi as a “Critical 
Needs Language” by the US State Department’s National Security Language Initiatives detaches the value of 
the language with the group that speaks it, becoming an extension of “foreign-ness.”21 It serves as a political and 
economic commodity in ensuring the security needs of the country, but not the security needs of the heritage 
speakers. Languages in this orientation are seen as commodities with economic and political qualities and values. 
He asserts that the “foreign-ness” and “un-American-ness” of Farsi is what allows for speakers of the language 
to assimilate quickly into being English monolinguals. Josh’s language orientation transformed from a problem 
into a resource, from the inconvenience of driving to Los Angeles led Josh to adapt the language-as-a-problem 
ideology of Farsi. He grew up in a rural town near Sacramento and viewed his status of group consciousness and 
membership to the Iranian community as somewhat problematic until he reached graduate school at the age of 27. 
Now, it now affords him the opportunity to move in-between spaces of white/non-white, and the commodification 
of the language enables him security into both spaces due to his status of being half Iranian. He states: “For me, 
to have access to the community, Farsi is a requirement. It’s also impressive for them to see some white kid 
speaking their language.” For full Iranians and for those who come from higher social class, this isn’t necessarily 
the case, to ‘impress’ those at socio-cultural events. In fact, it is the opposite: even though full Iranians make 
up the attendance of these events, they avoid speaking the language and do not care to attain the same level of 
social cohesion. The language is manipulated to create a symbolic boundary of ethnicity that is more commonly 
acknowledged across third generation immigrant children in America.
Symbolic Ethnicity through Language in LA
All participants noted how LA would serve as a place for an ‘imagined community’ to emerge as a means of 
maintaining nationalistic ties, but because of the divide within the community, linguistically tying the community 
together does not seem probable. While it would be assumed that higher class individuals assert more confidence 
and less embarrassment speaking their heritage language, being too “Persian” is seen as not only a political asset, 
but as a barrier that stops Iranian Americans from becoming truly “American.” Moreover, we see the creation of a 
self from other-ization, not only in the absence of Iranians, but even in the presence of many Iranians. The second 
generation faces the obstacle of American-izing to mainstream society, while keeping and maintaining cultural 
norms and values of the parents, embedded within the Persian language. The maintenance practices are low, and 
almost non-existent for the young second generation Iranian Americans that I interviewed. May, from the lower/
middle class, reported that “I personally don’t feel very comfortable speaking it [Farsi] down in Los Angeles. 
LA Persians are a different breed altogether, everyone around me has a very completely different understanding 
 21    Ricento, “Problems with the ‘language-as-resource’ discourse in the promotion of heritage languages in the USA.”
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of what it means to speak Farsi.” Because he does not substantially have the means to participate in the Iranian 
American community, being Iranian for him fell into definitions without monetary value.
 The language remains seen as a problem, neither a right or a resource. The presence of bakeries, rug shops, 
and tangible Iranian commodities made hearing Farsi for the first generation on the streets normal, says Jay. Yet, 
in these shops, shop-keepers know to initiate English to second generation instead of Farsi. The norm in LA is 
“to be Persian and not speak Farsi. At least in the second generation. I don’t really feel comfortable speaking it 
[Persian language] in LA. Other LA Persians, they’re not going to get it. They’re going to look at me and be like 
‘You’re really Persian Jay.’” Similar to Rhonda, Jay’s parents are living in a state of ‘exile’ – unable to return 
to Iran for political reasons. The language is selectively privatized. Yet, both groups face a sense of discomfort 
speaking the language, which should serve as a tool to binding people of the same ethnic group together. English 
is used within the ‘imagined community’ – meaning that language, a huge cultural factor, is not necessarily an 
indicator of tying people together. Within the ‘imagined community’ people feel embarrassed, ashamed, and 
uncomfortable to speak the language. Speaking Farsi doesn’t necessarily serve as a sign of group membership, 
as a few of my interviewees even went so far to mention pretending to not know the language at gatherings in 
order to separate themselves from their ethnicity and create a pan-ethnic hyphenated identity instead. Cultural 
nostalgia is more apparent in the younger diaspora members than in the older diaspora members I interviewed. 
Social dynamics at such cultural events predicates not only on politically based class relations, but on the outside 
socialization differences between men and women in elementary, middle, and high school.
Role of Gender and “Othering” Through Different Times in School
Regardless of age and social class, second generation Iranian Americans are embarrassed to speak their language 
in public and private. A theme they all shared was that they felt like being “too Persian” is a problem and they 
maintain the language only with family in the private sphere. However, I did find there to be a difference in gender 
as to how political events, such as 9/11, shaping formative experiences in school. All the first memories that 
came to mind of the men participants when asked to narrate a story about the language in relation to the school 
setting involved some sort of intervention or instance of ‘othering’ by an authority figure. The theme occurring 
was ‘othering’ by a teacher. Had I not gone back at my interview transcripts, I would have missed this pattern. 
While previous scholarship has looked at “terrorism as the organizing logic behind the gendered racialization of 
Iranian American boys and men as they attempted to fly to their destinations,” 22 the same concept can be applied 
to men’s ethnic identity in the public institutional realm of the schooling system, in comparison to women. Men 
were called out on their Iranian identity in the classroom setting by their teachers more so than women were. Men 
were more likely to be called out for their Iranian identity in high school than Iranian women were – yet still self-
identified themselves as Iranian rather than Persian, which has been condoned as being a more assimilative ethnic 
label for Iranian Americans, demonstrated through Andre’s comment: “I really, really try to say Iranian. That’s my 
goal. But even then, I find myself saying I’m Persian, in front of certain people.” When it comes to the dominant 
group, Andre will use saying that he’s Persian as a cover up.
Iranian women were called out for their Iranian identity and felt most uncomfortable symbolically defining 
it in elementary school or middle school and not as often in high school. Men have less Iranian friends than women 
do. Through formative experiences in school, their goal of assimilation was deeply ingrained in a post 9/11 era 
where ‘other-ism’ dictates their language practices through friends. Men often heard these types of comments 
from their friends as well: Andre, who is an active member of his Iranian club on campus, underwent various 
interventions with his classmates, friends, teachers, and strangers, and acknowledges his place as an outsider 
throughout his schooling life. He received comments such as: “Farsi sounds gross, and disgusting;” “What is this 
language that sound so hoarse to them.”  Andre: “Another thing, a lot of my teachers were very impressed…...
More just interested to learn about Iran. After hearing me speak Farsi with my Iranian friends. They’d be very 
intrigued when we would speak Farsi. And so...it… almost felt like we were being exoticized in a sense. They 
were very like…..They just didn’t really understand the concept of what Iran was.  We were being treated sort of 
like...subjects to pry questions out of. Especially about political issues they might have heard about on the news. 
 22    Maghbouleh, 120.
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They were just confused and wanted to learn more. Using us as a medium to do so. But it made me much more 
self-aware of speaking the language in public, I wouldn’t speak it in school after all this happened. I remember 
in 9th grade, in my geometry class, we came back from winter break, and my teacher asked everyone where we 
went, she said Christmas break. And I said “oh, I went to Iran” [nervously says]. And she said “oh, that’s very 
Christmass-y” or something like that. Something so stupid. I was like, that was such a distasteful comment, I felt 
so weird, it was a lot.” Josh adds: “Like even having a billboard to read in Farsi here, people would freak out. ‘Oh 
it’s terrorist attacks.’ People will just lose it; people aren’t used to that. That set me off to learn the language, it 
was just odd growing up.” The men in my study received these comments more often, resorting to hiding parts of 
their ethnic identity in public by speaking English and also were indifferent when asked if they wanted to improve 
their heritage language skills. 
Women, who attended elementary school during 9/11, contested their identity development and language 
through private spheres and against men. Men wanted to learn and maintain the language for “themselves,” while 
women wanted to learn and maintain the language to pass it down for future generations. Yet, being Iranian and 
not speaking Farsi was seen as acceptable. The definition of a ‘good Persian person’ to the girls I interviewed 
– meant not speaking the language in public and hiding Farsi and an Iranian identity into private spaces and 
resulting in fragmented ethnic solidarity. Brianna, whose parents travel often to Iran and is from the middle/upper 
class, explained to me that being seen as a “FOB” was something she worked hard against: “I didn’t want other 
people at school to hear me talking with my friend and think ‘oh, annoying Persian person. I was worried about 
how people would view me, especially post 9/11.’” She was six when 9/11 happened and reported that: “It was 
embarrassing to be speaking Farsi loudly.” Brianna explains this when she explains how her dad hid his Persian 
identity: “My dad owned a pizza shop, and he wouldn’t tell people he was Persian. A lot of people would assume 
he was Italian and he would just play it off very cooley. I remember wondering why he wouldn’t just tell them 
he’s Persian, or spoke Farsi. I remember getting annoyed about that. When I was in 6th grade, someone came in 
speaking Italian, my dad was like ‘oh I don’t know Italian,’ and so she asked if he was Italian and he said ‘half,’ 
he just lied.” Her comment is important because she then models after her father’s behavior about where and 
when it is safe to publicly display her “Iranian-ness” to the rest of the world – and when it is not.  Elias’ childhood 
experiences of being “othered” by classmates and his babysitter because of his ethnic background is related to 
his limited language maintenance practices as an adult and his limited abilities to practice the language in all its 
forms. In order to blend in with the dominant society, he has distanced himself away from using and maintaining 
the language, and continues to do so today. The same trend is shown with Frank: “Every time, we would go out 
to an American restaurant, I would get angst of, I don’t want to go through this process [with my dad].” Frank, 
who was nine years old when 9/11 happened, also received comments from his schoolmates/school peers, such as: 
“why does your dad do this [in response to 9/11]” but he justifies his bullying as a normative aspect of growing 
up in the United States: “that’s what kids do I guess.” 
In summary, those who were in elementary school during 9/11 are more uncomfortable to speak Farsi 
in public than those who were in middle and high school when 9/11 happened. For example, when asked “what 
are some advantages and disadvantages that you see in speaking Farsi,” Aislinn, who was an eighteen-year-
old woman when 9/11 happened, can point to the positive connotation of how Farsi can be seen as a right and 
as a resource, and not necessarily as a problem in comparison to other languages: “The fact that people don’t 
know [Farsi] is awesome. When people hear it they’re like, ‘what language is that?’ They think it’s awesome to 
know another language.” Yet, for younger members of the diaspora who were in elementary school after 9/11 
happened, they were met with comments in the school system leading to an internalized and externalized sense 
of Orientalism in their ethnic identities through language. This resulted in lower language maintenance practices 
today and a complication in defining ethnic identity, resulting in embarrassment. Elias, who was five when 9/11 
happened, reported an experience when he was a child, at the movies with his dad and brother where an outsider 
had asked if his dad was speaking Spanish. He felt ashamed to be Iranian at school, due to others calling him a 
“terrorist.” To this day, Elias reported maintaining the language through glancing at a Wikipedia article once a 
week “when he’s bored” and growing up, would not maintain the language on his own, even when his parents 
would. “I never would watch Iranian TV when my parents would. Maybe I’d watch for 5 minutes if I was really 
bored.” He has perceived the language to be inferior than other languages by marking it as ‘boring’ - thus to Elias, 
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the maintenance of the language is unimportant.
Children who were socialized in the 9/11 era undergo a process of language loss which contributes to how 
they appositionally view themselves and Iran. Ethnic solidarity and group consciousness is altered due to negative 
stereotypes regarding Iran that the second generation has internalized, and as a result, expresses a separate public 
identity. Interviewees expressed more concern with the language being spoken by men than by women. Ally, who 
was in elementary school when 9/11 happened, explains to me the spiraling effect political events have on not just 
how she symbolically defines her ethnic identity through language use, but how it also transmitted to her parents 
as well in the public sphere: “My mom is scared to speak Farsi at the airport. She doesn’t really. My dad has a 
very projecting voice, so sometimes he will speak Farsi at the airport, he’ll speak it so loud too. And so many 
people will just look, I hate it. My mom and I will tell him to be quiet. It really only happens in America though, 
not Europe.” To add on, Casey recalls his experience at the airport: “I had a stubble and a beard, I had a stamp in 
my passport from Iran from 3 years before when I was 12. At that point, I wanted to make myself seem as white as 
possible. Yeah, that’s me.” For Casey, being as “white as possible” means speaking English – in which he masks 
his ethnic identity in the public sphere. 
Through my interviews, a common theme is code-switching when with friends, but none of my participants 
reported that they have active conversations with people in only Farsi who are also Persian, even those who were 
actively involved in campus organizations and did take part in the community organizations. I argue that being 
selective with who you speak Farsi to serves as a sign of capital and status and reinforces social divisions within 
the Iranian American community. This is best explained through Rhonda’s comment: “I don’t want to speak Farsi 
with them, I don’t want to give them the satisfaction of speaking Farsi with me.”  People’s experiences with the 
community make an impact in how comfortable they feel to speak their native language in public, and in private 
spaces. Rhonda explains this: “I would stop speaking Farsi to my friends in public because people would come 
up to me and ask me how long it’s been that I’ve been in America. As in, they thought I was born in Iran. I didn’t 
want to attract attention.” 
“Othering” in different immigrant groups: 
         Although heritage language maintenance is viewed as a problem for second generation Iranian Americans 
based on underlying socio-psychological and socio-institutional forces,23 contrary to Ramezanzadeh’s argument, 
Iranian Americans are not the only immigrant group that are undergoing this at the worst. The process of language 
maintenance is further complicated by the sense of belonging that members of the Iranian community feel when 
speaking Farsi: as a linkage to the ‘projected homeland’ and as a way to distance themselves from their transnational 
pasts. When people were younger, they didn’t want to speak the language for fear of being ‘othered’ by the 
dominant community. Now, people don’t want to speak the language because they don’t want to be ‘othered’ by 
the Iranian community for their lack of Farsi skills. This is not only true of Iranians, but of other immigrant groups 
in the United States as well.
Due to the lack of literature on second generation Iranian Americans, I will draw in other primary and 
secondary sources from other immigrant communities to show how the process of ‘othering’ is universal across 
different immigrant groups in America. Examining second generation Cubans contrasts as a perfect comparison 
because of their similar immigration history to Iranian Americans. Their status as ‘Golden Exiles,’24 similar to 
the ‘model minority myth’ Iranian Americans have inherited marks them as an interesting case study to analyze. 
Immigration for Cuban Americans occurred in two waves: higher capital for those who came before the Cuban 
Revolution versus those who came after the Cuban Revolution, mirror the characteristics of Iranian immigrants and 
Iranian exiles. Miami has risen as a center for an ‘imagined community’ of Spanish speakers of Cuban descent.25 
However, college students in Miami note how social divisions within the Hispanic community bring a sense of 
marginalization as a result of their limited Spanish abilities. Expressing emotions of doubt, embarrassment, and 
self-consciousness contributed to how they viewed their ethnic identities in relation to an ‘imagined linguistic 
community’ of Spanish speakers that could emerge. 26 Participants noted facing comments such as: “Oh, you’re 
 23    Ramezanzadeh. 
 24    Lanier, “Identity and Language Perception among Second-Generation Spanish Speakers in Miami.”
 25    Lanier.
 26    Lanier, 47.
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Hispanic, you can’t even speak the language correctly.”27 Additionally, Lanier refers to studies conducted by 
Lynch, which links her results of Miami-born Cubans distancing themselves for their heritage language in order to 
create a distance from them and more recent immigrants from Cuba.28 Similarly, found from my data, when asked 
how often they go to community events, Frank expressed that his reason for not going to the events anymore was 
“there’s a lot of very new Persians there now, there’s just a divide. My Farsi isn’t as good as theirs, I don’t really 
find the appeal to talk to them. We might not have much in common and we just don’t make an effort to talk to each 
other.” This can be best explained from how even in a single ‘linguistic community,’ there is an establishment of 
relations for linguistic domination.29 Although a theme came up in my interviewees about how speaking Spanish 
results in less stares from others and more opportunities to practice the language, Spanish speakers debate this 
through limited classes offered at school: “[you] take classes up to fifth grade…and they still don’t speak Spanish 
because it’s only up to when you’re 11 years old, and then they’ll never take Spanish again unless it’s for high 
school.”30 It would be wrongful to say that second generation Iranian Americans’ reason for losing their heritage 
language is a unique experience that only applies to them and the dominant forces of society that work against 
them; these dominant forces of society work and act against other members of other immigrant communities. 
 It is also worth noting the Chinese and Japanese languages are classified as ‘Critical Needs Languages’ 
alongside with Farsi. Therefore, Asian Americans undergo the same cycle of struggling to symbolically define 
their ethnic identity: Tuan’s study of interviewing 3rd, 4th, and 5th generation Chinese and Japanese Americans 
living in Northern and Southern California closely mirrors my study. She looks at the case of California because 
with the largest number of Asian Americans living here, it serves as the perfect case study to see how salient 
of a role ethnic identity plays in their lives. A male interviewee expressed his ethnicity as a burden in public: 
“You feel kinda conscious about how they’re gonna treat you and that kind of thing, and I think it actually has 
socially hindered me in some ways. I use [being on alert] as a safety mechanism because you never actually know 
what’s going to happen.”31 Her results highlight a trend of men hiding their ethnic identity more so in public than 
women do, which are consistent with my findings of second generation Iranian American identity. Similar to my 
interviewees answers, one of her interviewees who didn’t know Chinese confessed having limited opportunities 
to use it even if she had the knowledge: “To tell you the truth, I don’t really know where I’d be using it except if I 
had a job where speaking Chinese was a necessity.”32 The difference is that second generation Iranian Americans 
are both choosing not to associate with their ethnic identity in order to recreate a racial boundary of ‘whiteness’ 
between themselves and the new arrivals from the Islamic Republic through monetary gains. For example, Patricia 
justifies “some of them would be like, asking me to write their papers. They’d be like ‘Oh, I’ll pay $100 if you 
write a paper for me.’ Then I would, in a way, be like, ‘oh in America, that doesn’t cut it.’” While it can be argued 
that the language can be seen as a resource, she problematizes its use by reinforcing the social divisions herself 
within the Iranian American community. In summary, our studies show the various pathways immigrant children 
are exceptionally excluded from the status quo, but the issue of how to better incorporate all immigrants remains 
unresolved. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, social class in the host country works as a continuous boundary for members of a diasporic 
community who struggle to understand their place through exceptionally short outlets. Because a huge part of 
language maintenance falls on these community organizations as support, what can be done, as a community, to 
make these spaces feel more inviting for different classes to practice the language and express ethnic identity? 
The problem is that Iranian Americans do not feel comfortable themselves speaking their heritage language, as 
children and as now adults. The need for resources in this community are apparent in order to better understand 
the historical context of Iranians in California and the process which language loss is occurring in the sociocultural 
 27    Lanier, 26.
 28    Lanier, 26.  
 29    Bourdeui, “Language and Symbolic Power,” 429.
 30    Lanier, 53.
 31    Tuan, 223.
 32    Tuan, 107.
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and institutional spheres. While participants in my study noted the need for more accessible resources as well, the 
continued altered relations between Iran and the United States will work its way against the language maintenance 
of this group, and other groups in America. The fluidity of ethnic identities of second generation immigrants 
are complicated through group cohesion and broader socio-political forces, such as living in a post 9/11 world. 
Consistent with other literature on generational ties that immigrants hold in America, it is safe to hypothesize that 
as Iranian Americans progress generationally, symbolic ethnicity will hold itself less and less through language and 
more through materialistic cultural symbols. Unfortunately, it will be reinforcing a divide within the community. 
Until recently, within this century, scholars have not adequately researched the experiences of the new second 
generation – doing so is important in understanding the economic and social outcomes of how the country will 
ultimately be shaped. The US strategically places heritage language values as having a subtractive value depending 
on their own agenda, which is shaped through outside political forces. In history, heritage languages are usually 
seen as being less, and even outlawed in certain states. Thus, I argue and reiterate that linking languages as 
commodities de-links them to communities and links them to economic and military events, especially after 9/11 
and even in the ongoing War on Terror and updated Muslim Ban. This research adds onto the limited, but growing 
scholarship of Iranian American identity and to second generation immigration studies within American context. 
Media representations as harmful: through ‘terrorists’ to ‘materialist’ on Shahs of Sunset where language exposure 
is also minimal. Iranian Americans, as a ‘model minority group’ still face their own problems. Future research 
should interview Farsi speakers who are not solely from Iran; the case of Afghan Americans holds different 
political and social implications than for Iranian Americans in relation to their ethnic identity development and 
contestation. Future research can offer to include factors of sexuality and mental health which critically play a 
role into ethnic identity development and its relation to language use. Additionally, conducting detailed research 
studies on mixed Iranian Americans, as well as comparative studies between Jewish Iranian Americans and Baha’I 
Iranian Americans, also adds more to dialogue to the scholarly literature available on how symbolic ethnicity is 
seen as a choice or a pressure between other immigrant groups who are also mixed as well. Gaining access to these 
communities is difficult, but pose the important question of how ethnic identity is maintained in different realms 
of the Iranian American community and will contribute to the lack of literature on the perception of political and 
cultural values of Iranian American youth living in California. Furthermore, the researcher acknowledges the 
inability to generalize the entire Iranian American population – its extremely heterogeneous nature and various 
pathways of assimilation/ acculturation differ on a variety of factors. I am hoping that fields of ethnic studies, 
sociology, and psychology can better incorporate the Middle Eastern community and Iranian American research 
as time progresses. This research works as a pathway to begin understanding more about the history of the Iranian 
American community, specifically Muslim Iranian American community – as they are here to stay.
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Appendices
Challenges recruiting participants: 
Two participants, who were older men in their 40s and came here as young children, that I reached out 
to expressed an interest to participate, but refused to be interviewed. Their reasoning was because of the painful 
memories that were brought back into immigrating into this country. One potential participant had stated that 
talking about his experience acculturating into American society ‘brings back too many painful memories to 
think and talk about. I don’t like to think about it in any way.’ Additionally, I reached out to Iranian student 
organizations at Cal State Fresno and Cal State Bakersfield and was not met with a response. Most importantly, I 
attempted to get a mixed number of people from different parts of California. I was able to yield an equal number 
of participants from Northern California and Southern California. I additionally planned to interview three parents 
in order to holistically understand their perspective immigrating but was unable to, due to time constraints. 
